Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition Long Overdue by Burns, Conrad
Montana Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 2 Summer 1996 Article 2
7-1-1996
Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A
Proposition Long Overdue
Conrad Burns
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Conrad Burns, Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition Long Overdue, 57 Mont. L. Rev. (1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/2
DIVIDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS: A PROPOSITION LONG OVERDUE
Senator Conrad Burns*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 20, 1996, the United States Senate passed a bill
to create a commission to study the entire federal appellate judi-
cial system with particular reference to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. This bill took the form of a substitute amend-
ment to legislation which was reported out of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on December 21, 1995, that directed the
division of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
I submit this article to provide some insight into the devel-
opment of this legislation, to discuss the relative merits of the
concept of splitting the Ninth Circuit, and to offer a few thoughts
on the commission that was ultimately proposed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview
The question of whether--or how-the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be divided has a lengthy
legislative history which spans over half of a century.1 In 1972,
recognizing the problems faced by the courts of appeals and
responding to the urgings of Chief Justice Burger and others,
Congress created the Commission on the Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System commonly known as the Hruska Com-
mission.2 In its 1973 report, the Hruska Commission recom-
mended that the old Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit be divid-
ed, noting particularly the Ninth Circuit's "striking" size, its "se-
rious difficulties with backlog and delay," and its "apparently
inconsistent decisions by different panels of the large court."3 As
a result, the Commission "concluded that the creation of two new
* United States Senator from Montana. I would like to extend a special
thanks to Brett Scott, my General Counsel, for his efforts in assisting me prepare
this article.
1. Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why The Proposal To
Divide The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit Is Not Such A
Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917, 923-29 (1990).
2. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The
Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for
Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 224 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission Report].
3. Id. at 228-29, 235.
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circuits is essential to afford immediate relief' to citizens living
in states in the Ninth Circuit.
Members of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Commission's find-
ings and formally opposed the Commission's recommendation to
split these two courts. Consequently, Congress did not take ac-
tion on the Commission's findings and recommendations, and the
problems identified by the Commission persisted and, in fact,
worsened over the next five years.5 In 1978, recognizing the
continuing problems plaguing these two courts, Congress autho-
rized courts of appeals with more than fifteen judges to reorga-
nize into administrative units and to streamline the en banc
hearing procedure.6
In May of 1980, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council arranged
the Fifth Circuit into two administrative units, though it main-
tained the unities of the en banc court and judicial council. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council immediately realized that
this arrangement was unworkable, and unanimously petitioned
Congress to divide the court into two autonomous circuits.7 As a
result, Congress passed legislation to divide the Fifth Cir-
cuit.' Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reorganized itself into three
administrative units and further adopted a limited en banc pro-
cedure.9 Such "innovations" have not only failed to resolve the
problems facing the Ninth Circuit, but, in fact, they have exacer-
bated them. °
4. Id. at 228.
5. See discussion infra part III.
6. The authorization reads:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute
itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as
may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
and may perform its en banc function by such number of members of its en
banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.
Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633.
7. See Thomas M. Reavley, The Split of the Fifth Circuit: Update and Finis,
12 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5-7 n.52 (1981); see also Hearing on S. 948 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Administration Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 642 (1990) (statement of Gilbert F. Ganucheau).
8. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1, 41 (1994)).
9. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 6 OF THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO
IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 (1989); see also
JOSEPH CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE
NINTH CIRcuIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
10. See infra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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B. Congressional Action to Split the Ninth Circuit
1. Legislation to Split the Ninth Circuit in Previous Congresses
In 1983, Senator Slade Gorton, of Washington, introduced a
proposal to split the Ninth Circuit. That bill, S. 1156, would have
divided the Ninth Circuit into a new circuit consisting of Arizo-
na, California, Nevada, Guam, and Hawaii, and a Twelfth Cir-
cuit consisting of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Wash-
ington.' This bill was not reported out of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary.
In 1989, I joined Senator Gorton in introducing S. 948,
which would have divided the circuit by creating a new Ninth
Circuit comprised of Arizona, California, and Nevada, leaving the
remaining States and territories to form a Twelfth Circuit.'
This legislation likewise failed to gain sufficient support in the
Committee on the Judiciary and died without getting the atten-
tion of the full United States Senate.
In the 102nd Congress, 1st Sess., Senator Gorton and I once
again introduced legislation to split the Ninth Circuit. S. 1686
essentially reproposed the same division outlined in S. 1156.
That formulation had also been introduced in the United States
House of Representatives in the 101st Cong., 2d Sess., as H.R.
4900. Neither of these bills were reported out of Committee.
An entirely different formulation was introduced in the
House of Representatives in the 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., in a bill
sponsored by Representative Kopetski, H.R. 3654. That proposal
11. S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
12. S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The United States Department of
Justice, recognizing the negative impact of the Ninth Circuit's problems upon law
enforcement, endorsed S. 948 stating:
When the nine circuits were established in their present form in the late
nineteenth century, even before circuit courts of appeals were created in
1891, the population of the United states was centered much more heavily
in the East. Six circuits were established for 22 states east of the Missis-
sippi, while the Eighth and Ninth Circuits covered the 22 states and terri-
tories west of the Mississippi. (The only other states to the west, Texas and
Louisiana, were assigned to the sprawling Fifth Circuit covering the six
states of the Deep South). Since then, in response to geographic and case-
load problems, Congress divided the original Eighth Circuit to create the
Tenth Circuit in 1929, and divided the former Fifth circuit, to create the
Eleventh Circuit in 1980. In that sense, retaining vast territory and popula-
tion of the Ninth Circuit in one circuit is an historical anomaly.
Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Prac-
tice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 5 (March 6, 1990).
1996]
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would have divided the Ninth Circuit in a manner similar to
that recommended in 1973 by the Hruska Commission, which
had recommended dividing California between circuits. 3 This
bill likewise failed to gain sufficient support and died in Commit-
tee.
2. Legislation to Split the Ninth Circuit in the 104th Congress
During the 104th Congress, Senator Gorton and 114 intro-
duced S. 956, a bill to create a new Twelfth Circuit comprised of
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington, leaving the
remaining States and territories to comprise the new Ninth
Circuit.15 In order to generate interest in this legislation, on
May 26, 1995, I placed holds on the pending and future nomi-
nees to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals during the 104th
Congress.16
On September 13, 1995, the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary conducted a hearing on S. 956.17 Particularly evident at
13. H.R. 3654, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). H.R. 3654 would have placed
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, the Northern District of California, and the Eastern District of California in
the new Ninth Circuit, with the remaining Ninth Circuit districts to be placed in the
Twelfth Circuit. That effort reflected a concern with ensuring that a split of the
Ninth Circuit created a fairly even split of the caseload and judgeships of the Ninth
Circuit between the new circuits.
14. Joining Senator Gorton and me as original co-sponsors of this legislation
were Senator Stevens, Senator Murkowski, Senator Packwood, Senator Hatfield, Sen-
ator Craig, and Senator Kempthorne. Initially, Senator Baucus joined as an original
co-sponsor but removed his name from the original co-sponsorship list. See SENATE
JUDICIARY COMM., NINTH CIRcurr COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995,
S. REP. No. 197, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
15. This legislation was first introduced on May 25, 1995, as S. 853. See 141
CONG. REC. S7497-02 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton). A minor
technical correction was made to the bill, and it was reintroduced as S. 956 on June
22, 1995. See 141 CONG. REc. S8945-01 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
16. At the time, the pending nominees were Atsushi Wallace Tashima and
William Alan Fletcher. Subsequent to my placing holds on all Ninth Circuit nomi-
nees, a Montanan, Sid Thomas, was nominated to the Ninth Circuit. While I whole-
heartedly endorsed his nomination and testified on his behalf at his nomination hear-
ing, I feared that if I released any of my holds, I would lose the leverage that the
holds had given me over other Members that had generated interest in this legisla-
tion. This turned out to be the case.
17. Testifying with me in support of S. 956 at that hearing was Senator
Gorton; Chief Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit; and John McKay, Esq., a practitioner from Seattle, Washington. Oppos-
ing this legislation at the hearing was Senator Inouye; Senator Reid; Senator
Murray; Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; Judge Dairmuid F. O'Scannlain of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/2
PROPOSED NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT
this hearing was the concern that S. 956 would leave a Ninth
Circuit that would still be too large and that could itself raise
the question of whether it should be further subdivided in the
near future. Judge O'Scannlain particularly noted that S. 956, as
introduced, "would do nothing to solve the problems of the re-
maining ninth circuit."18 To address this concern, Senator
Gorton and I developed an alternate proposal that Senator Hatch
offered on my behalf. This substitute amendment to S. 956,
which would have established a new Ninth Circuit consisting of
California, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands
and would have left the remaining States as a new Twelfth Cir-
cuit, was reported favorably out of Committee on December 7,
1995, by a vote of 11-7."9
When the bill was reported out of Committee, I began solicit-
ing support for the legislation. However, by mid-March it became
apparent that this had become a partisan issue.20 Consequently,
on March 20, 1996, Senator Gorton, Senator Kyl and I compro-
mised with Senator Reid, Senator Feinstein, Senator Biden, and
Senator Kennedy on legislation to create a commission to study
the entire federal appellate system, with particular reference to
the Ninth Circuit.2 This compromise was agreed to by voice
vote and was reported to the House of Representatives, where it
is presently pending.
Circuit; Professor Arthur D. Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law;
and Charles E. Jones, Esq., a practitioner from Phoenix, Arizona.
18. SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
19. Id. at 11.
20. By mid-March, I had received assurances of support for the bill reported
out of Committee from forty-seven Republican Senators; Senator Baucus was the only
Democratic member offering support for the bill. Furthermore, it appeared unlikely at
that time that I would be able to get the 60 votes necessary to invoke cloture on
this issue; I had released the holds that I had placed on Ninth Circuit nominees at
the request of the Republican Majority Leader, Senator Dole (apparently, Senator
Baucus had placed holds on a Dole nominee for Kansas District Court and a Hatch
nominee for the SEC, asserting that he would release these holds if I would release
my holds on Ninth Circuit nominees).
21. The Commission is comprised of eleven members: three to be appointed by
the Senate Majority Leader in consultation with the Senate Minority Leader; three to
be appointed by the Speaker of the House in consultation with the House Minority
Leader; three to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court; and two members to be appointed by the President of the United States. The
Commission is required to complete its study and make its recommendations by no
later than February 28, 1997 to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 142 CONG.
REC. S2544 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
1996] 249
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III. THE DEBATE: THE RELATIVE MERITS OF SPLITTING THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
Over the past five decades, the debate over whether the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should be divided has persisted.
The arguments which convinced the Hruska Commission to rec-
ommend the splitting of the Ninth Circuit still exist today; in
fact, conditions have grown steadily worse since 1973.22
A. The Arguments in Favor of a Split
1. Size, Delays, and Efficiency
The Ninth Circuit spans nine States and two territories
covering fourteen million square miles. It serves a population of
more than forty-five million people. The next largest circuit in
terms of population, the Sixth Circuit, serves fewer than twenty-
nine million people; in fact, every other federal circuit serves
fewer than twenty-four million people. By 2010, the Census Bu-
reau estimates that the Ninth Circuit's population will be more
than sixty-three million people, which represents a forty-three
percent increase in fifteen years. As Judge O'Scannlain of the
Ninth Circuit testified before the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary, "[I]n light of the demographic trends in our country, it is
clear that the population of the states in the ninth circuit, and
thus the caseload of the federal judiciary sitting in those states,
will continue to grow at a rate significantly ahead of most other
regions of the country." "
Further, the Ninth Circuit already has twenty-eight active
judges, making it by far the largest circuit court. The next larg-
est circuit court, the Fifth Circuit, has seventeen active judges,
while the smallest circuit court, the First Circuit, only has six.
The average number of judges in the federal circuits other than
the Ninth Circuit is 12.6.
22. Today, the Ninth Circuit remains the same size geographically as when the
Hruska Commission recommended that it be split. In terms of judges and caseload,
however, the court has grown substantially. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit was composed
of 13 judges and received an annual caseload of approximately 2,300 filings. Since
then, the Ninth Circuit has grown to 28 active judges, and the caseload has in-
creased to upwards of 8,000 appellate filings each year. In addition, last year the
Ninth Circuit requested, and the Judicial Conference of the United States recom-
mended, that Congress approve 10 new judgeships for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Thus, an even larger Ninth Circuit appears likely in the not too distant
future. SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4.
23. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 57
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Also, the Ninth Circuit's size has contributed to delay in
case processing in the circuit. As Chief Judge Wallace stated in
his written testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
"it takes about four months longer to complete an appeal in our
court as compared to the national median time."24 The most
recent statistics provided by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts reveal that the Ninth Circuit is noticeably slow by
other measures. The Ninth Circuit is next to slowest in the time
from the filing of a case in the lower court to the final disposition
in the court of appeals. It is slowest from the filing of the last
brief in a case to a hearing and submission of the case for deci-
sion."
Many have cited the court's enormous size as a factor in the
court's inability to process the large number of cases filed in the
circuit each year. According to Chief Judge Tjoflat, the Eleventh
and Fifth Circuits combined process many more cases every year
than the Ninth Circuit, and they have sometimes done so with
fewer judges altogether, given judicial vacancies.26 In recent
years, the combined Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, containing a
total of twenty-nine authorized judgeships, have resolved on the
order of fifty percent more cases each year than the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which has twenty-eight authorized judgeships.27 Chief
Judge Tjoflat attributed these results to collegiality among mem-
bers of the court.28
2. Intracircuit Conflicts and En Banc Review
The large number of judges also creates intracircuit conflicts
and increases the likelihood of inconsistent decisions among
panels within the circuit. With twenty-eight authorized judges on
24. Id.
25. This particular statistic, however, is of negligible import given the circuit's
notable delays in overall case processing. Id.
26. Id. at 9-10.
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 9-10.
28. Chief Judge Tjoflat observed that large circuits are necessarily prone to a
less collegial environment. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Judges, 79 A.BA
J. 70, 70-71 (1993). The more judges that sit on a court, the less frequent a particu-
lar judge is likely to encounter any other judge on a three-judge panel. Breakdown
in collegiality usually leads to a diminished quality of decision-making. Judge
O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit likewise noted in his testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary that as a court of appeals becomes increasingly large, it
loses the collegiality among judges that is such a fundamental ingredient in effective
administration of justice. In a court like the Ninth Circuit, with 28 authorized judges
and 3,276 possible combinations of panels, this fact is particularly evident. Id.
1996] 251
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the Ninth Circuit, there are 3,276 possible combinations of pan-
els, not including the significant number of panels including
senior judges and judges sitting by designation. The number of
three-judge panel decisions and the sheer size of the caseload
makes it increasingly difficult for judges in the Ninth Circuit to
keep abreast of Ninth Circuit decisions to avoid conflicting deci-
sions. Judges and other individuals seeking to conform their
conduct to circuit law also encounter serious obstacles in assess-
ing the law of the Ninth Circuit. Anecdotal evidence indicates
that the Ninth Circuit is marked by an increased incidence of
intracircuit conflicts.29
Compounding that problem, the Ninth Circuit does not use
the traditional en banc procedure for resolving intracircuit con-
flicts. Instead, the Ninth Circuit uses a limited en banc proce-
dure in which an eleven-judge panel, consisting of the Chief
Judge and ten circuit judges chosen by lot, review cases en banc.
This method permits as few as six of the sitting judges to dictate
the outcome of a case contrary to the judgment of twenty-two
others, solely depending upon the luck of the draw. 0 Under the
Ninth Circuit's rules, the court may decide to review a case using
the full en banc court. However, ever since the adoption in 1980
of Circuit Rules permitting the Ninth Circuit to hear cases
through limited en banc procedures, the Ninth Circuit has never
elected to hear a case sitting as a full en banc court. True en
banc review in the Ninth Circuit is effectively nonexistent, and
intracircuit inconsistencies are much more likely to go unre-
viewed. This may explain, in part, why the Ninth Circuit typical-
ly has a high reversal rate by the United States Supreme Court.3
29. Chief Judge Tjoflat argued at the hearing that it is impossible to conduct a
reliable empirical study of intracircuit conflicts because "[t]here are so many ways in
which precedent can be disregarded in cases." SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10
n.19.
30. The purpose of the en banc court is to establish the law of the circuit by a
majority of all the judges, not by a simple majority of a subset of judges randomly
chosen, whose decision may not be representative.
31. Senator Feinstein suggested in her additional views submitted to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, that the assertion that the Ninth Circuit experiences a
higher reversal rate than other circuit courts is without support. To the contrary, the
Ninth Circuit's reversal rate, while fluctuating from year to year, has been document-
ed to be remarkably high. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, A Working Majority: Supreme
Court Review, NATL L.J., July 1, 1995, at C-1 (ninth circuit reversal rate in the
Supreme Court for the 1994-1995 term was 82 percent); David Lauter, In Moderate
Pursuit of Conservative Goals: Supreme Court Review, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2, 1985, at S-
2 (noting that "[tihe justices continue to reverse a disproportionately high percentage
of the cases coming to them from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.").
252 [Vol. 57
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B. The Arguments Against a Split
During February of 1996, the Office of the Circuit Executive
for the United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit distributed a
Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956 Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995 and Companion Bill H.R.
2935.32 In this package, ten arguments were offered against
splitting the Ninth Circuit, with specific reference to the split
proposed in S. 956.3'
1. Circumstances are unchanged from 1990 when the Senate
fully considered and rejected earlier legislation that differed in
only minor respects from S. 956.
Initially, it should be noted that the substitute amendment
to S. 956 is substantially different with respect to the proposed
circuit compositions from previous bills to split the Ninth Cir-
cuit." Notwithstanding that fact, the Ninth Circuit's suggestion
that a bill's merit is in any way linked to that bill's success in
Congress is unfounded. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's argument here
is frivolous 5
2. Creating two circuits from one without increasing judicial
resources would not address the fundamental problem of
expanding caseloads and delays; dividing the Fifth Circuit in
1980 has resulted in no long-term benefits in expediting case
processing.
32. OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExEcUTIvE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-
PEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
S10436 (daily ed. July 20, 1995). Because the Executive Summary to the Position
Paper listed the arguments in opposition to legislation to split the Ninth Circuit in a
much more succinct manner and did not combine issues, I have chosen to organize
my responses to these arguments in a manner consistent with the Executive Summa-
ry.
33. H.R. 2935 and S. 956 were identical in the proposed split of the Ninth Cir-
cuit; consequently, the Position Paper made no distinction between the two bills.
34. While it is true that Congress has reviewed several bills splitting the Ninth
Circuit in a variety of ways, the split proposed by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary presents Congress with a formulation of first impression. The present legis-
lation strikes a balance among three competing considerations which have led past
Congresses to reject legislation: (1) the split should be as close to an even split as
possible; (2) the split should not create a circuit consisting of only one state; and (3)
the split should not divide the State of California.
35. If such an argument were successful, I can't imagine any legislation of im-
portance ever getting through Congress.
1996] 253
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There can be little doubt that the division of the Fifth Cir-
cuit was a monumental success. Prior to its division, the twenty-
six judges of the Fifth Circuit resolved 4,717 appeals.36 During
1995, the combined Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, comprised of
twenty-nine combined authorized judgeships, resolved 12,401
appeals.3 7 Tripling the output while only adding three new judge-
ships certainly indicates that splitting the Fifth Circuit yielded
long-term benefit. According to Chief Judge Tjoflat, who was on
the Fifth Circuit Court when it was divided, the increase in court
efficiency is a direct result of collegiality on the court.38 He con-
cluded that the twenty-eight judges on the Ninth Circuit, which
resolved 8,307 appeals, would experience a similar increase in
court efficiency.39
3. Dividing the Ninth Circuit would increase the potential for
inconsistent law relating to admiralty, commercial trade, and
utility law along the western seaboard.
I believe that admiralty, commercial trade, and utility laws
have remained acceptably consistent along the eastern seaboard,
which is comprised of six circuit courts. Thus, I believe that the
Ninth Circuit has overstated its argument here. However, to the
extent that splitting the Ninth Circuit might create inconsistency
in admiralty, commercial trade, and utility law on the western
seaboard, such a concern is minor when compared to the over-
whelming benefits in judicial efficiency which will be generated
by dividing the circuit.
4. Establishing a circuit consisting of just two states would
defeat the traditional federalizing function of multi-state circuits
that is a central purpose of the American federal appellate
system.
While it is true that the Hruska Commission established the
requirement that circuits would be composed of at least three
36. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 348 tbl. B-1 (1981).
37. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 88, 90 tbl. B-1 (1995).
38. Tjoflat, supra note 28, at 70-73.
39. ADMINISTRATVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 90 tbl. B-1 (1995); see also Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, (1995) (statement of the Hon. Gerald
Bard Tjoflat, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit).
254 [Vol. 57
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states as one of its general criteria for circuit court realign-
ment,' it is unclear whether the Commission intended these
criteria to be absolute.41 Notwithstanding that fact, I believe
that the benefits yielded from splitting the circuit outweigh any
benefit in maintaining a minimum state requirement in estab-
lishing circuit court composition.42
5. The estimated costs to construct a new Twelfth Circuit
headquarters range from $23 to $59.5 million, plus $2-3 million
in annual costs to duplicate existing administrative functions. An
additional headquarters would result in waste of taxpayer dollars
spent on the recently completed $100 million earthquake
rehabilitation of the court's historic headquarters in San
Francisco.
Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) place
the additional operating costs in the first year at approximately
$5 million.' Further, CBO estimates that following the first
year, annual operating costs would be increased by $2-3 mil-
lion." I do not believe that there will necessarily be a need for
additional headquarters. Presently, the Ninth Circuit has facili-
ties in Seattle, Portland, and Phoenix which could accommodate
the headquarters of the newly created Twelfth Circuit.
40. Hruska Commission Report, supra note 2, at 231-32.
41. It is telling that, while the Ninth Circuit judges are quick to rely upon the
general criteria set forth as part of the Hruska Commission's findings, they are just
as quick to dismiss the overall recommendation of the Commission: that the Ninth
Circuit should be divided.
42. Presumably, the Hruska Commission recognized that single-state circuits
made little sense and feared that in two-state circuits, one state could overwhelm the
other, and consequently set the minimum states requirement at three states. While I
agree that single-state circuits make little sense, I disagree with the proposition that
two-state circuits are a bad idea. Further, to suggest that, because California cases
would comprise approximately 90% of the caseload of the newly created Ninth Cir-
cuit, splitting the circuit as contemplated by S. 956 is inappropriate, disregards the
present circumstances in the Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. Presently, New
York cases account for approximately 87% of the Second Circuit's docket, while Texas
cases account for approximately 70% of the Fifth circuit. SENATE REPORT, supra note
14, at 7 nn.14-15.
43. Letter from the Congressional Budget Office, to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chair-
man, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 9, 1995) (concerning S. 956) (on file with au-
thor).
44. I believe that these costs are inflated. The suggestion that splitting the
circuit will necessitate duplication of administrative personnel in the two circuits is
exaggerated. Presently, the Ninth Circuit maintains a large enough administrative
staff to service the separate divisions of the court. Funding for staffing requirements
for the newly created Twelfth Circuit could be satisfied in large part from reductions
in the old Ninth Circuit.
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6. The vast majority of judges and lawyers in the Ninth Circuit
have repeatedly voted their preference for retaining the current
configuration of the Ninth Circuit.
As Senator Kyl, a former practicing attorney and member of
the Arizona Bar Association, stated before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, oftentimes the overall position of the bench or
bar association does not reflect the position of the majority of
practicing attorneys in that state.45 The fact that the Attorneys
General from California, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Oregon,
Washington, and Alaska unanimously agree that the Ninth Cir-
cuit should be split sustains Senator Kyl's observations.4"
7. The official bar organizations of Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, and Nevada, and the Federal Bar Association,
have all adopted resolutions opposing any division of the Ninth
Circuit.
As noted above, the formal bar association position does not
reflect all, or for that matter the majority, of the views of the
legal community in the Ninth Circuit. I do concede that some
attorneys, as a general proposition, have a vested interest in
maintaining the uncertainty of legal precedent in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. For example, uncertainty in the law stimulates litigation,
thus, making money for civil attorneys. Likewise, it increases the
arguments available to criminal defense attorneys. In fact, the
only attorneys who do not benefit from uncertainty in legal pre-
45. It is not surprising that the district court judges, whose decisions are ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the attorneys, who practice before the Ninth Circuit,
have expressed their opposition to splitting the circuit. Opposition to splitting the
circuit curries favor with the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit. Likewise, the silence
of those attorneys and judges who would otherwise have supported splitting the
circuit, is understandable. By the same token, the Ninth Circuit judges' reluctance to
publicly oppose Chief Judge Wallace on this issue is understandable. Finally, Chief
Judge's opposition-and more recently Chief Judge Hug's opposition-to splitting the
circuit is not surprising. The Ninth Circuit receives roughly 20% of the entire
amount appropriated by Congress for operating the Federal Appellate Courts, which
provides the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit with a great deal of power (this was
recently illustrated by the 1995 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference which was held in
Maui, Hawaii, at a total cost of approximately $1 million).
46. See letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, Alan G.
Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana,
Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, and Christine 0. Gregoire,
Attorney General of Washington, to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Sept. 12, 1995) (on file with author); see also letter from Daniel E.
Lundgren, Attorney General of California, to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate
Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 26, 1995) (on file with author).
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cedent are the prosecutors, who have consistently endorsed di-
viding the circuit.
8. The Ninth Circuit has become a national leader in
experimentation in judicial administration, developing solutions
that are models for the rest of the country.
While it is true that the Ninth Circuit has employed a num-
ber of experimental procedures to make the court more efficient,
unfortunately many of these devices have lengthened delays and
encouraged litigation in the Ninth Circuit. For example, the
limited en banc procedure undermines the ultimate goal of the
en banc procedure, which was created to resolve intracircuit
conflicts by a majority of judges on the bench. With such a limit-
ed en banc procedure, less than one quarter of the court can
make such a determination. Furthermore, the limited en banc
device is expensive, time-consuming and ineffective with regard
to maintaining unity in the law of the circuit. The "justice by lot"
selection procedure, in particular, weakens allegiance to the en
banc holdings and makes reconciliation of precedents even less
likely.
9. Total case processing time in the Ninth Circuit is not
significantly longer than the national median; any remaining
delay is due to unfilled vacancies and a lack of additional Judges
the Ninth Circuit has requested. The Ninth Circuit Judges are
the fastest in the Nation in disposing of cases once the panel
receives the cases.
The statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts last year suggest the contrary. In his testi-
mony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Chief Judge
Wallace of the Ninth Circuit conceded that the Ninth Circuit
takes approximately four months longer to complete an appeal as
compared to the national median time, which is approximately
ten months.
10. The Ninth Circuit would welcome an independent,
congressionally-mandated study of federal appellate courts to
update Congress before it makes far-reaching structural changes.
In 1973, the Hruska Commission conducted an extensive
study of the federal appellate system and came to the conclusion
that the Ninth Circuit should be divided. The Ninth Circuit
1996]
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judges opposed the recommendations of the Hruska Commission
and Congress deferred. Since that time, Congress has reviewed a
variety of proposals to split the Ninth Circuit, and each time, the
Ninth Circuit Judges voiced opposition. Now that the Senate has
settled upon establishing a commission to study the federal ap-
pellate courts and recommend reform, I look forward to working
with the Ninth Circuit in expeditiously implementing the
commission's recommendations at the conclusion of its study.47
IV. A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE COMMISSION
From the outset of this debate, I have maintained that the
issue of whether to divide the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the issue of whether to appoint a commission to study the
entire federal appellate system and recommend long-term reform
measures, are separate issues and should be treated as such. In
my opinion, division of the Ninth Circuit is the only responsible
solution to the immediate problems which confront Ninth Circuit
judges, practitioners and litigants. A study of the entire federal
appellate system, on the contrary, is an appropriate measure
with respect to the other federal circuit courts, which, though
they do not have the problems identified earlier in this article,
might develop administrative problems; it does not, however,
address the immediate conditions presented by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
Unfortunately, though, the political reality, which unfolded
this past year, is that Congress is presently unwilling to divide
the Ninth Circuit over the objection of the Chief Judge of the
Ninth Circuit. As a result, we compromised and proposed a com-
mission to formulate a long-range strategy for addressing the
anticipated problems which might develop in the federal appel-
late system, and, in so doing, we postponed addressing the im-
mediate problems presented in the Ninth Circuit.
With respect to the commission, I believe that any radical
restructuring of circuit boundaries or the creation of a super-
appellate court' will be actively opposed by the federal appel-
47. It is my hope that, should the Commission recommend that the Ninth Cir-
cuit be divided, the Ninth Circuit will support this recommendation with the same
enthusiasm that they have opposed this legislation historically.
48. In 1988, the 100th Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee
which was charged with the responsibility of studying the federal appellate system
and recommending a long term plan for the judiciary. Without endorsing any plan,
the Committee proposed the following as options: (1) dissolve the present geographic
circuits and draw new circuit boundaries to create new regional courts; (2) create an
[Vol. 57258
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late judiciary.49 Consequently, should the commission make
such a recommendation, it is unlikely that Congress would adopt
it. Similarly, Congress is not likely to adopt any recommendation
which limits federal jurisdiction for two reasons. first, state
courts, whose caseloads would increase as a result of such a
proposal, would uniformly oppose such a plan. Second, Congress
is unlikely to adopt a plan which has the effect of restricting fed-
eral legislation. As a result, I believe that the only proposal
which has any chance of passing Congress is a proposal which
divides the Ninth Circuit, to resolve the immediate problems
presently facing that court, and deferring on the issue of reform-
ing or restructuring other circuits until problems develop.
V. CONCLUSION
Much has been written by legal scholars in opposition of
splitting the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While most of the
legal treatises agree that some action should be taken--either
now or in the near future-to address the continuing problems
faced by the Ninth Circuit, few advocate that the Ninth Circuit
should be divided. Rather, these legal scholars offer innovative
reform measures like redefining circuit court boundaries or re-
structuring the federal appellate court system. However, all of
these articles ignore the political reality facing each of these
proposals: Congress is unlikely to adopt any reform proposal
which is opposed by the legal community.
additional appellate tier; (3) create national subject matter courts with specialized
national jurisdiction; (4) merge all the federal courts of appeals into a single central-
ly-organized court that has the authority to create and abolish special subject matter
panels; and (5) consolidate all the circuit courts and create perhaps five "jumbo"
circuits. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION, 101st Congress., 2d Sess., Report
115, 118-123 (April 2, 1990).
49. This was certainly true when the Hruska Commission studied such propos-
als and concluded that:
We have not recommended a general realignment of all the circuits. To be
sure, the present boundaries are largely the result of historical accident and
do not satisfy such criteria as parity of caseloads and geographical compact-
ness. But these boundaries have stood since the nineteenth century, except
for the creation of the Tenth Circuit in 1929, and whatever the actual ex-
tent of variation in the law from circuit to circuit, relocation would take
from the bench and bar at least some of the law now familiar to them.
Moreover, the Commission has heard eloquent testimony evidencing the
sense of community shared by lawyers and judges within the present cir-
cuits. Except for the most compelling reasons, we are reluctant to disturb
institutions which have acquired not only the respect but also the loyalty of
their constituents.
See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 2, at 228.
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Meanwhile, as this debate continues, problems in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals grow worse. I believe that we should
address the immediate problem presented by the Ninth Circuit
and then turn to more esoteric discussions of radical judicial
reform. By failing to do so, we are doing a great disservice to
judges, practitioners, and litigants in the Ninth Circuit.
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